TOP would set a 30 GW renewable capacity target for 2050 — roughly triple today’s — locked in through a 25-year cross-party Energy Strategy. New generation would be underwritten by a Capacity Investment Scheme modelled on Australia’s. Four energy regulators would merge into one, and 29 distribution companies into six to eight. The Crown’s dividends from its gentailer shareholdings, about $500 million a year, would be ringfenced to pay for household and community electrification.
Transpower’s “Accelerated Electrification” scenario gets to roughly 22 GW by 2050, which the document says is enough to muddle through decarbonisation but not to deliver abundance. Reaching 30 GW means building slightly more each year than the 556 MW added in 2024, sustained for decades. Because that depends on private investment over a very long horizon, TOP would seek a cross-party 25-year Energy Strategy — the stated point being to end “on-again off-again” pumped hydro and LNG announcements.
Modelled on Australia’s, which the document says has already supported more than 18 GW and will unlock over $70 billion of investment. Competitive tenders would award long-term government contracts guaranteeing new renewables and storage a minimum revenue, with excess revenue above a ceiling price shared back with the government. Two deliberate limits: the guarantee applies only to a project’s second decade of operation so market price signals survive, and initial tender rounds are restricted to new entrants to build competition against the incumbent gentailers.
A mirror-image scheme for large industrial energy users: long-term government guarantees, won through competitive tender, that their electricity price will not exceed a set amount if they switch off fossil fuels. The stated purpose is timing — creating baseline demand that arrives alongside the new generation the capacity scheme brings on.
The document’s sharpest claim about the status quo is that the biggest single beneficiary of high power prices is the government itself, through its majority stakes in three of the four big gentailers — which leaves successive governments with no incentive to change the rules producing those profits. Ringfencing that revenue is meant to break the conflict and pay for everything else in the policy.
Four bodies currently oversee energy with overlapping mandates. Their key functions would merge into a single modern energy regulator and a single Ministry of Energy. A national policy statement on generation and distribution would make consenting easier and less litigated, covering grid-scale generation and storage, generation for direct commercial use, and small distributed infrastructure in homes.
New Zealand has 29 electricity distribution businesses, ranging from Vector with over 600,000 customers to Buller Electricity with under 5,000. The document argues they lack the scale to fund decarbonisation, and that the Commerce Commission’s light-handed regulation has held allowable capital investment down. It would consolidate them into six to eight firms and rewrite the revenue rules for them and Transpower to permit anticipatory investment — building capacity before it is needed rather than in response to demand.
Rewiring Aotearoa’s electrification loans would be adopted as a national Ratepayer Assistance Scheme run by councils, borrowing through the Local Government Funding Agency. The document is specific that because the loan attaches to the rateable property and no shareholder holds more than 20 percent, the debt sits on neither council nor central government books.
Two funds: one supporting communities and electricity distributors to work together so local schemes are accommodated on the wider grid, and direct government co-investment in community-owned generation and storage up to 15 MW. The argument made for it is resilience and efficiency of the whole system, not just local benefit.
EECA’s existing insulation and heating programme would have its funding doubled and its scope extended to appliance electrification and rooftop solar for low-income households — the households the document says are least able to capture those benefits on their own.
A mandate on councils to electrify urban bus fleets by 2030, fully centrally funded, covering both vehicles and charging infrastructure. The document expects spillover benefits: the charging capacity built for buses makes electrifying heavy freight easier later.
Grid stability comes primarily from overbuilding — having more renewable capacity than the grid needs, so wind and solar run ahead of hydro and water is left in the dams as a fast-response reserve, topped up by new geothermal and hydro. Household and community storage is described as building resilience and shifting peaks rather than solving dry years; grid-scale storage helps with peaks too. Huntly stays available as a true-emergency backup rather than a routine part of the mix.
The document explicitly rejects three things. The LNG import terminal, on the grounds it locks in imported fuel and exposure to volatile international prices. Structural separation of the gentailers, as lengthy and costly without addressing what they see as the real problem — the incentive to underinvest. And counting deep core geothermal or fusion in the planned generation mix, as unproven at grid scale, while supporting research and noting the capacity scheme is technology-neutral if a breakthrough comes.
Every operating cost is drawn from the ringfenced dividends rather than new revenue — but the document is explicit that taking that money out of core Crown revenue is itself a cost needing another source, and names the land value tax. The Capacity Investment Scheme sits separately as a contingent liability on the balance sheet with a stated expected value of $0, since it is designed never to pay out. TOP also publishes the assumptions behind its jobs, GDP and savings claims, citing MBIE and Sense Partners, BERL, Treasury, Powerswitch, Rewiring Aotearoa and BBVA Research.
“New Zealand is an energy-rich country that behaves as though we are energy-poor.”
“This will take this funding away from core crown revenue, so represents a direct cost that will need to be funded through other revenue sources; like the land value tax.”
“No. This locks us in to long-term reliance on imported LNG.”
“Modelling the impact of large-scale policies like these is necessarily difficult and uncertain. We have taken a conservative approach to the claims we make and based these on similar modelling by reputable bodies.”
Points the document defers or leaves undefined. These are gaps in the document, not criticisms of the policy.
Which party holds a published position on which topic.
Swipe across to see all 11 topics — the party column stays put.
| Party | Economy | Housing | Health | Education | Climate | Environment | Crime & Justice | Treaty & Māori Affairs | Immigration | Foreign Policy | Democracy & Government |
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| Labour | ∅ | ∅ | ∅ | ∅ | ∅ | ∅ |
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